

Active Shooter Threat Analysis, Mitigation, and Response



*Special Report Prepared by
the PT-OTRB & ST ISACs*

March 12, 2018

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Purpose

The Public Transportation (PT) - Over the Road Bus (OTRB) & Surface Transportation (ST) Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) are providing this Special Report for your general security awareness.

Utilization of any standards or guidance discussed herein is strictly voluntary. The practices implemented by rail, transit, and OTRB systems may be either more or less restrictive than any recommended practices or guidance given in this document. In some cases, federal and/or state regulations govern portions of public transit systems' operations. In those cases, government regulations should take precedence over the information or guidance provided herein. Organizations should consult their own agency's/organization's policies and guidance before taking any actions based on the information presented in this Special Report.

This Special Report supplements guidance and analysis already provided in daily reports produced by the PT-OTRB & ST ISAC. Of note, the last page of this report lists references for additional information.

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Special Report: Active Shooter Threat Analysis, Mitigation, and Response

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I. Introduction

The wave of active shooter and active attacker incidents across the United States and abroad in recent years highlight the unpredictable nature of such events, as well as the importance of enacting certain protective security measures to mitigate their potential impact. While most recent attacks occurred at non-transportation related facilities, the public nature and presence of large crowds both in-and-around public transportation venues make them potentially attractive targets for: violent extremists, mentally troubled individuals, disgruntled citizens and employees, or criminals intent on inflicting mass casualties.

As with any physical threat, preparation and coordination between law enforcement and facility personnel in response to an active shooter scenario is critical. Employees should be instructed to remain vigilant and report all odd or suspicious activity to security officers and law enforcement personnel charged with protecting transportation assets. All businesses should also prepare, regularly exercise, and continually evolve active shooter and all hazard emergency response plans. Safe areas should be established for refugees during crises. Managers should develop and regularly test communication protocols to alert employees and effected personnel to immediate threats. Active shooter training must be effective for all employees to ensure their knowledge of response plans and the specific protective actions that must be taken. All emergency communications equipment must be routinely tested and exercised to determine 24/7 operational primary and redundant systems availability.

II. Active Shooter Defined

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area,” noting that, “in most cases, active shooters use firearm(s) and there is generally no pattern or method to their selection of victims.” The New York City Police Department (NYPD) further limits its definition to include only those cases that spill beyond an intended victim to others. Both definitions provide for the inclusion of similar acts of mass violence that employ weapons other than firearms, such as knives or other melee weapons into the “active shooter” category. However, most of the available information covering this topic generally focuses on gun-dominated scenarios only.

III. Historical Analysis

Active attacker incidents are inherently dynamic and unpredictable, varying widely from one incident to another. A review of past active attacker events reveals a large degree of variation



among attacks with respect to the attacker’s age, number of perpetrators, tactics, targets, number of casualties, location(s), weapons employed, and resolution. These dynamics complicate efforts at building a useful threat profile. Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis of a compendium of active shooter events from 1966 through 2012 compiled by the New York Police Department (NYPD) in its 2012 edition of “Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation,” and a comparison to a comprehensive analysis of active shooter data titled “Active Shooter Incidents in the US Between 2000-2016,” published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), does provide insight into the active shooter phenomenon [See Figure 1 Below].

Figure 1 – Active Shooter Incidents in the U.S. from 2000-2016. Figure 1 is a summation of key data points drawn from the FBI’s list of active shooters incidents between 2000 and 2016 by PT, OTRB, and ST ISAC analysts. The data gleaned from the report includes the gender of shooter, number of assailants, shooter’s connection to the location of the attack, the motive of the attacker(s) if it could be identified, the age of the shooter, the conclusion of the active shooter incident, and the number of locations involved in the active shooter incident. PT, OTRB, and ST ISAC analysts then specifically highlighted transportation-related incidents for comparison to the overall data set.

		OVERALL		TRANSPORTATION RELATED	
TOTAL		220		23 – 10.5%	
Gender		Male	Female	Male	Female
		214 – 97.3%	6 – 2.7%	22 – 95.7%	1 – 4.3%
Single Attacker		214 – 97.3%		22 – 95.7%	
Connection to Location of Attack	Domestic	18 – 8.2%		-	
	Former Employee	50 – 22.7%		9 – 39.1%	
	Former Student	3 – 1.4%		-	
	Student	37 – 17.3%		-	
	Lawsuit	6 – 2.7%		1 – 4.3%	
	Medical	2 – .9%		-	
	None	98 – 44.5%		13 – 56.5%	
	Unidentified	2 – .9%		-	
	Resident	4 – 1.8%		-	
Age		Min	Max	Min	Max
		12	88	18	72
Motive	Domestic Dispute	23 – 10.5%		2 – 9.1%	
	Eviction	1 – .5%		-	
	Mental Illness	3 – 1.36%		-	
	Unclear	69 – 31.4%		8 – 3.6%	
	None (altercation)	9 – 4.5%		-	
	None (terrorism)	22 – 10%		2 – 9.1%	
	Professional (employee)	39 – 17.7%		5 – 22.7%	
	School Shooting	39 – 17.7%		-	
	Revenge	16 – 7.3%		4 – 18.2%	



Conclusion	Suspect At Large	4 – 1.8%	-
	Suicide	81 – 36.1%	6 – 26.1%
	Surrender	10 – 4.5%	1 – 4.3%
	Force	125 – 56.8%	16 – 69.6%
Mobile Shooter (2+ Locations)		43 – 19.5%	11 – 47.8%

A. General Active Shooter Characteristics

A large degree of variation exists between active attack characteristics, but analysis of the data in both the NYPD and FBI reports yields the following important findings:

- **Active shooters are overwhelmingly male;** accounting for at least 97% of the perpetrators in the NYPD data set and 97.3% in the FBI data set.
- **Active shooters tend to act alone;** 98% of the attacks within the NYPD data set and 97.3% of the attacks in the FBI data set were carried out by a single actor.
- **Active shooter events can occur without provocation or at locations unconnected to the attacker(s); however, the majority of active shooters are members of the communities they target:**
 - FBI data reveals that the majority (54.5%) of the attackers had a connection to the location of the incident.
 - NYPD data concurs with this finding, indicating that 74% of perpetrators bore some previous connection to at least one of the victims of the attack; however they note, the remaining 26% of active shooters had no previous connection to the victims, suggesting that active shooter events can still occur absent a previous “altercation or grievance.”
- **While the age of active shooters is wide-ranging, a target-based correlation does exist:**
 - Within the FBI data set, the age of the attackers spanned from 12 to 88
 - However, according to the NYPD figures:
 - At schools, the majority of active shooters were 15-19 years old.
 - At non-school facilities, the majority of active shooters were 35-44.
- **The motive of an active shooter can vary from mental illness to revenge or terrorism.**
 - Of the 87 attacks documented in the NYPD data set where the attacker bore some professional connection to a victim, less than 1/3 were perpetrated by former employees.
 - Many of the attacks instead resulted from a disagreement between employees of an organization, indicating that the active shooter phenomenon is not primarily driven by disgruntled employees or terrorism.



B. Frequency

The FBI report concludes that there has been an increase in active shooter events over the past 12 years. According to the FBI report, the most dramatic increase occurred between 2009 and 2012, when attacks tripled from just 5 per year from 2000 to 2008 to 16 per year from 2009 to 2012. The FBI analysis also finds that these attacks are becoming increasingly more deadly. The NYPD analysis supports the FBI's assertion that active shooter incidents in the U.S. have grown more frequent and deadly since the year 2000. While it concludes that it "has not observed evidence of an increase in active shooter incidents from 2006-2012," a careful review of their data set does support the FBI's findings of an increase from 2009 to 2012. According to the NYPD data, the number of attacks per year nearly doubled during that period, increasing from 9 attacks per year from 2000 to 2008 to nearly 17.5 per year from 2009 to 2012.

C. Location

Both the FBI and NYPD data sets reveal that the most common targets are businesses, accounting for 43.2% of the target locations. Despite overwhelming media coverage, the data suggests that fewer than 22% of active shooter events occur at schools. According to the FBI, 19.5% percent of attackers "went mobile" or started at one location and moved to another. NYPD analysis notes that among its data set, attacks at restricted commercial facilities, such as warehouses or office buildings, occurred at the same frequency as attacks at open commercial facilities, such as retail stores.

D. Resolution

History demonstrates that once an active attacker event begins, it is likely to continue until either the perpetrator(s) commits suicide or are confronted by either law enforcement or a potential victim at the scene. According to the FBI report, force was used to stop 56.8% of the assailants in incidents that were ongoing when they arrived at the scene. In events that ended before the police arrived, the attacker(s) committed suicide 36.1% of the time; the shooter surrendered in 4.5% of these attacks.

E. Transportation Specific Data

Neither the NYPD nor FBI reports specifically highlighted threats against the transportation industry in their analysis. However, a careful review of each incident included within both the NYPD's compendium and the FBI's dataset of active shooter incidents provides some relevant data. Altogether, of the 220 incidents in the FBI report and the 324 incidents in the NYPD report, 40 threatened the transportation sector at some point: 18 involved highway infrastructure in



general, 8 occurred at airports, 8 threatened the trucking sector, 3 threatened the bus industry, and 3 threatened the railroads [See Figure 2 Below].

Figure 2 – Transportation-related Active Shooter Incidents. Figure 2 is the totaled data relating to the transportation sector from the same FBI dataset of Active Shooter Incidents in the US Between 2000-2016 released in 2016 and the NYPD Active Shooter Report released in 2013. The data was categorized by the specific aspect of the transportation sector affected by the active shooter incident called “place of incident,” the motive and/or connection of the shooter to the incident, the conclusion of the event, and which database from which the incident originated.

Place of Incident	Airport		Rail	Bus	Truck	Road	
	8 – 20%		3 – 7.5%	3 – 7.5%	8 – 20%	18 – 45%	
Motive/ Connection	None (terrorism)	Professional (employee)	None	Familial (mental illness)	Familial (domestic)	Lawsuit	None (altercation)
	9 – 22.5%	10 – 25%	16 – 40%	1 – 2.5%	2 – 5%	1 – 2.5%	1 – 2.5%
Conclusion	Force		Surrender		Suicide		
	28 – 70%		4 – 10%		8 – 20%		
Database	FBI		NYPD		Both		
	21 – 52.5%		15 – 37.5%		4 – 10%		

*For detailed descriptions of the compiled active shooter incidents related to the transportation sector from both the FBI dataset from 2000-2016 and the list of active shooter events from the NYPD compendium see **Appendix A Transportation-related Active Shooter Incidents** located at the end of this report.

The transportation related data appears to largely parallel the broader data set. Characteristics such as attack location, perpetrator profiles, and motivation varied significantly across incidents. While the perpetrators behind 8 out of 8 active shooter events at airports appeared to be motivated by the political or ideological extremism that typically characterizes terrorism, only 1 of the 32 remaining incidents actually had a potential terrorism connection. Aside from the anomaly of terrorism driving active shooter events at airports, the data largely coincides with broader active shooter trends already presented; except that only 43.4% of the perpetrators possessed some previous professional or familial relationship with at least one victim. Mental illness played a key role in at least one event as well. As in the broader NYPD/FBI active shooter compendium, the majority (69.6%) of active shooter incidents that threatened the transportation sector ended in force.

It is important to note that some incidents may have begun with the assailant targeting non-transportation related organizations, but directly threatened transportation equipment and/or infrastructure, employees, or patrons as they moved between attack sites. The data highlights the importance of considering not only the active attacker threat to fixed installations, but also assets in transit that might be directly targeted or could encounter an active attacker scenario during normal operations.



F. Attack Timeline

Overarching statistics that provide an average duration of all active shooter incidents or the average response time by authorities are not readily available. However, a review of several high-profile incidents over the past nine years by PT, ST, & OTRB ISAC analysts did provide some insight. Though one event – the mobile mass shooting and bombing in San Bernardino, California, in 2015 – continued for more than two hours, the attack phase of every other incident reviewed by our analysts lasted between seven and 10 minutes. Meanwhile, the law enforcement response time for these events ranged from one to 15 minutes. The most efficient response occurred when law enforcement and/or armed security was already on-site before the event began. This data corresponds with analysis on school shootings produced by the Department of Homeland Security that indicates the average active shooter event at schools lasts approximately 12.5 minutes and the average police response time is 18 minutes. Data compiled by the FBI, indicates that nearly 70% of all active shooter events end before police arrive. This data suggests that time is the most valuable resource. Placing a premium on threat identification and notification is key and illustrates the importance of developing, maintaining, and practicing response plans and procedures. Ultimately, it is the actions of staff within the first few minutes after an attack that will dictate survival. Emergency plans and security measures should also consider the entire attack cycle, as a majority of events conclude before law enforcement arrives.

IV. Threat Mitigation

Active shooter incidents can occur without warning and often evolve rapidly. They generally feature extreme and unexpected close-in violence. In general, private and public security officials and personnel should consider the following security practices compiled by the PT, OTRB, and ST ISACs to mitigate the active attacker threat.

1. Develop an Active Attacker Plan:

- Designate a person or committee to develop and maintain an active attacker plan and incorporate it into the organization’s preparedness plan.
- Conduct a realistic security assessment to determine an organization’s vulnerability to an active attacker. Consider the speed with which these attacks can occur.
- Identify multiple evacuation routes:
 - Post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout the facility
 - Ensure that evacuation routes account for individuals with special needs and disabilities
- Designate shelter locations or “rallying points” within the confines of the facility:
 - Identify areas with thick walls, as few windows as possible and solid doors with locks



- Stock first-aid emergency kits, communication devices, and duress alarms
 - Designate a point-of-contact with knowledge of the facility’s security procedures and floor plan to immediately work with police and other emergency agencies in the event of an attack.
 - Establish a central command station for building security.
 - Establish a comprehensive Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan that includes all critical elements of the primary security plan to include emergency communications.
 - Consider Enhanced Security Measures. Vary security guards’ patrols and patterns of operation.
 - Implement credential-based access control systems that provide accurate attendance reporting, limits unauthorized entry, and does not impede emergency egress.
 - Install closed-circuit television systems that provide domain awareness of the entire facility and its perimeter; ensure that video feeds are viewable from a central command station.
 - Provide communications infrastructure that allows for facility-wide, real-time messaging and establish communication protocols and means to instruct personnel on immediate personal protective actions.
 - Install/modify elevator systems that may be controlled or locked down from a central command station.
 - Install secure locks on all external and internal doors and windows with quick-release capability from within for emergency escape.
2. Implement Training and Exercise Plans:
- Ensure all employees are knowledgeable of current active shooter and other emergency response plans.
 - Train employees on response options when an active shooter is in the vicinity:
 - **“Run”**: Employees should evacuate the facility or leave the immediate area if safe to do so; evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualize their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators or escalators.
 - **“Hide”**: If evacuating is not possible, employees should hide in a secure area out of the attackers view and block entry to their hiding place: lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, and cover all windows. Turn off all lights, silence any electronic devices, lie on the floor, and remain silent. Try to identify areas with thick brick walls and few windows.
 - **“Fight/Take Action”**: As a last resort, if neither evacuating the facility nor seeking shelter is possible, employees should attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter. Use surprise if possible and act with aggression by throwing objects, using extreme force, and yelling. Employ immediately available



items in the area (e.g., furniture, or other equipment) to protect oneself and disarm the attacker(s).

- Advise employees on potential immediate actions to secure cover that provides protection from weapons and use immediately available improvised protective devices.
- Advise employees to keep their cell phones with them to ensure communications with first responders and others.
- Train employees to call 911 as soon as it is safe to do so.
- Test first responders' response times and identify and address them in security plans
- Train employees on how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene:
 - Follow all official instructions
 - Remain calm
 - Keep hands empty and visible at all times
 - Avoid sudden or alarming movements
- Incorporate an active attacker drill or exercise into the organization's regular emergency preparedness procedures to:
 - Validate procedures
 - Practice evacuation routes in varying conditions
 - Test communication systems and protocols
 - Evolve plans and procedures based on lessons learned

V. Informed Vigilance Matters

While security plans and measures put in place are of critical importance, history demonstrates that few countermeasures are more effective in mitigating threats than the sustained vigilance of security personnel and the general public. Based on day-to-day experience in their work settings and a familiarity with their surroundings, residents, frequent riders and transportation employees are particularly well-placed to notice suspicious items, or behavior, that could indicate an emerging or imminent threat. When in public, everyone should remain attentive to what's common and what's different from that which is normally seen or heard; noting specifically the observation of items that vary from the norm, are out of place, or otherwise prompt concern. More critically, once aware of a potential problem, personnel should promptly report what was seen, when, and where in the greatest detail possible.

The mass transit/rail sectors should continue to promote reporting programs such as "If You See Something, Say Something," and then "Do Something" which encourage both employees and patrons to contact local law enforcement or security if suspicious activity is observed. History demonstrates that it is often a tip received by a vigilant employee or citizen that saves lives by identifying a threat before, or as, it emerges.



Potential indicators of pre-operational surveillance or attack planning include:

- Presence of trespassers or other suspicious individuals on transportation sector property
- Persons lacking appropriate background or qualifications who attempt to gain employment within a rail or mass transit system
- Persons engaging in overtly suspicious actions to provoke and observe responses by security personnel
- Persons showing unusual interest in sensitive information about security measures, access controls, personnel, entry points, and hours of operation
- Persons attempting to discreetly use cameras or video recorders, or sketching or note-taking, near mass transit sites or property
- Unwarranted observation of, or questions about facility equipment, security drills, or procedures
- Repeated visits by the same subjects to the same, or similar locations
- Persons attempting to disguise or change appearance
- Attention to, or avoidance of, surveillance cameras or other countermeasures
- Presence of people wearing inappropriate attire for the weather

In addition to the indicators above, mass transit and rail security personnel should also remain on the lookout for potential indicators that any type of attack may be imminent. These include:

- Suspicious bags or containers left unattended at or near mass transit facilities, or on buses, rail cars, or along their routes
- Damaged mass transit property or infrastructure
- Persons whose behavior indicates an inordinate amount of stress, anxiety, or nervousness such as profuse sweating or irritability, or any other behavior that might cause concern

If you have any questions about this document please contact the ISAC at **866-ST-ISAC1** (866.784.7221) or email mcanalyst@motorcoachisac.org.



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Appendix A – Transportation-related Active Shooter Incidents. Appendix A is a table of relevant data and a brief description of active shooter incidents related to the transportation sector from both the FBI dataset from 2000-2016 and the list of active shooter events from the NYPD compendium. The data is categorized as follows: the date of which the event took place, the city/locations of the active shooter event titled “Location”, which industry of the transportation sector affected by the active shooter incident called “Place,” a brief description of the incident, the motive and/or connection of the shooter to the incident, the conclusion of the event, and which database from which the incident originated. Figure 2 is derived from Appendix A.

Date	Location	Place	Description	Motive/Connection	Conclusion	Database
5/29/1972	Airport City, Israel	Airport	Three Japanese Red Army members recruited by the PFLP opened fire on crowds at Lod International Airport.	None (Terrorism)	Suicide	NYPD
8/5/1973	Athens, Greece	Airport	Two assailants opened fire and threw grenades in a crowded lounge at Athens Airport.	None (Terrorism)	Surrender	NYPD
12/27/1985	Vienna, Austria	Airport	Three Abu Nidal gunmen opened fire at Vienna’s Schwechat Airport.	None (Terrorism)	Force	NYPD
12/27/1985	Rome, Italy	Airport	Four Abu Nidal Organization gunmen opened fire at the Leonardo da Vinci Airport.	None (Terrorism)	Force	NYPD
8/9/1987	Melbourne, Australia	Road	Assailant opened fire on pedestrians and cars from atop a billboard platform.	None	Force	NYPD
8/19/1987	Berkshire, UK	Road	Individual initiated an extended shooting spree, during which he indiscriminately fired while driving down the road.	None	Suicide	NYPD
4/30/1989	North Tyneside, UK	Road	Shooter initiated an extended shooting spree, indiscriminately firing at nearby gardens, houses, and passing cars.	None	Force	NYPD
12/7/1993	New York State	Rail	Assailant opened fire in a crowded car on a Long Island Railroad train.	None	Force	NYPD
4/28/1996	Tasmania, Australia	Bus	Individual initiated an extended shooting spree, during which he opened fire on a bus and later fired from a vehicle at pedestrians and vehicle passengers.	None	Force	NYPD
4/23/2001	San Jose, CA	Truck	Assailant began shooting in the Laidlaw Transit Services maintenance yard	Professional (employee)	Force	FBI
7/4/2002	Los Angeles, CA	Airport	Gunman entered Los Angeles International Airport and began shooting at the EL AL Israel Airlines ticket counter	None (terrorism)	Force	Both
7/8/2002	New Orleans, LA	Airport	Assailant opened fire at Louis Armstrong International Airport.	None (altercation)	Force	NYPD
10/2/2002	Washington D.C. Area	Road	Two assailants initiated a 3-week shooting spree, firing indiscriminately at motorists at 14 different locations.	None (terrorism)	Force	NYPD
10/26/2002	Oklahoma	Road	Gunman began shooting from his vehicle at pedestrians and drivers	None	Surrender	FBI
11/6/ 2003	West Chester,	Truck	Gunman began shooting in the offices of Watkins Motor Lines	Professional	Force	Both

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	OH			(employee)		
5/7/2004	Mississauga, Canada	Truck	Individual opened fire at a trucking facility.	Professional (employee)	Surrender	NYPD
8/8/ 2007	Perrysburg, OH	Truck	Gunman began shooting at his co-workers in the Liberty Transportation facility. He had just been fired.	Professional (employee)	Force	FBI
9/2/2008	Alger, WA	Road	Assailant shot a police officer at the shooter's home and then drove down Interstate 5 shooting drivers and another police officer.	None	Surrender	FBI
11/26/2008	Mumbai, India	Rail	LeT militants launched a series of coordinated shooting and bombing attacks at 10 different locations, including the Chhatrapati Shivaji Rail Terminus.	None (Terrorism)	Force	NYPD
4/24/2009	San Diego, CA	Bus	A Veteran Metropolitan Transit System employee fired on a bus depot complex.	Professional (Employee)	Force	NYPD
1/12/2010	Kennesaw, GA	Truck	Individual began shooting in the Penske Truck Rental facility where he had recently been fired	Professional (employee)	Force	FBI
10/4/2010	Gainesville, FL	Road	Individual began shooting as he drove around Gainesville, Florida	Familial (mental illness)	Suicide	Both
3/2/2011	Frankfurt, Germany	Airport	Assailant opened fire inside a bus at Frankfurt International Airport.	None (Terrorism)	Force	NYPD
12/2/2011	New York City, NY	Bus	Individual opened fire on a bus.	Familial	Force	Both
4/6/2012	Tulsa, OK	Road	Two individuals each armed with a handgun, began shooting as they drove	None	Force	FBI
12/21/2012	Frankstown Township, PA	Road	Individual armed with two handguns, began shooting at citizens as he drove	None	Force	FBI
5/26/2013	Brady, TX Jacksonville, NC	Road	Individual began shooting from a moving vehicle as he drove down a road after fatally shooting his wife	Familial	Force	FBI
8/24/2013	Lake Butler, FL	Truck	Individual began shooting at his co-workers from Pritchett Trucking, Inc.	Professional (employee)	Suicide	FBI
11/1/2013	Los Angeles, CA	Airport	Individual allegedly began shooting in Terminal 3 of Los Angeles International Airport	None (terrorism)	Force	FBI
5/23/2014	Isla Vista, California	Road	After stabbing 3 inside his apartment earlier that day, the shooter began driving through town, shooting from his car.	None	Suicide	FBI
6/6/2014	Cumming, GA	Road	Individual armed with three handguns, a rifle, and chemical grenades, began shooting from his vehicle	Lawsuit	Force	FBI
8/2/2014	Pinetop, AZ	Road	Individual began shooting in the parking lot a casino. Then the shooter	None	Force	FBI

			moved to the middle of the nearby highway and began shooting at passing cars.			
9/23/2014	Birmingham, AL	Truck	Individual began shooting in a UPS shipping facility in from where he had recently been fired.	Professional (employee)	Suicide	FBI
2/25/2016	Newton and Hesston, KS	Road	Individual began shooting from his vehicle then traveled to his place of employment and continued shooting	Professional (employee)	Force	FBI
5/4/2016	Katy, TX	Truck	Individual began shooting as he entered the Knight Transportation. The shooter had been fired from the company two weeks prior.	Professional (employee)	Suicide	FBI
5/24/2016	Phoenix, AZ	Road	Individual allegedly began shooting at motorists along a highway	None	Force	FBI
7/7/2016	Bristol, TN	Road	Gunman began shooting while on foot at a hotel and at motorists along Volunteer Parkway	None	Force	FBI
8/13/2016	Joplin, MO	Road	Individual allegedly began shooting from his moving vehicle at motorists in two vehicles while being pursued by law enforcement officers.	None	Force	FBI
9/26/2016	Houston, TX	Road	Individual began shooting at morning commuters	None	Force	FBI
10/25/2016	Roanoke, VA	Rail	Individual began shooting inside his former place of employment	None	Suicide	FBI